Turkey has played a crucial role as a vital Western asset in the region since the outbreak of the Syrian internal struggle.
The President of the Turkish Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, criticised since the earliest stage of the hostilities the position of Bashar Al-Assad, the ruler of the Alawite Syrian regime, calling for a complete overhaul of the establishment in Damascus and for domestic democratic reforms.
The Middle Eastern dynamics pre-Arab Springs, which saw the two states developing a mutual trust, and initiating important economic and military agreements, represent the complexity of the current situation; the change of the Turkish foreign policy towards Damascus did not simply stem from a democratic and idealistic sentiments, but is the direct consequence of a thoughtful strategy which poses the preservations of country’s interests at its core.
The instable geopolitical situation, which followed the 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq, provided a common threat perception, which led Damascus and Ankara to set aside the political diversities. The tense relations between the two countries, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, made room to a complete reformulation of their foreign policies; the regional order post-Saddam imposed the necessity of the creation of a quasi-alliance between the neighbours.
After the election of Erdogan in 2002, 2003-2011 was characterised by a strong feeling of friendship and cordial relations between the two governments, which managed to find common ground on many international issues, such as the Alexandretta case, which concerned the annexation of a region previously Syrian in the Turkish Republic and the water supply problems. The military cooperation in 2009 and 2010 rose substantial concern among neighbouring countries. (Pisanò. F (2017), La Turchia di Erdogan: Tra Primavere Arabe e Caso Siriano, Alpha Institute of Geopolitics and Intelligence)
The outbreak of the Arab Springs, however, changed dramatically the regional context. The “zero-problem neighbourhood” policy, which sought to create a nexus of alliances and economic ties between Ankara and key regional players in the attempt to increase the Turkish soft power on the region, failed considerably Turkey found itself politically unprepared to deal with these radical events.
However, with the Syrian case the situation is different. Ankara responded promptly to the Syrian riots, calling its ally in Damascus to start a process of internal reforms a few days after the first protests. This timely course of actions was probably also informed by the mere realization by the Turkish establishment to have acted with undue delay on the Libyan issue. The Turkish plan that aimed to exploit the Syrian crisis to enhance its international status at the eyes of the European Member States found two main obstacles. Ultimately, these led it to its final defeat: the crucial support of Iran and Russia to the Assad regime and the unwillingness of the Europeans and Americans to find themselves in a Libyan like situation. By openly criticizing the Syrian regime, Ankara not only lost important regional allies as Damascus and Teheran, but it also failed to be seen as a reliable partner by the neighbouring European countries. Erdogan found itself alone struggling to solve the issue.
The Syrian Civil War has surely changed the Middle Eastern assets. The difficulties to fight against the Islamic State without putting boots on the ground, obliged the Western World to seek for regional allies, which were once considered enemies. This is the case of the Kurds, Russians and Iranians. All saw the Syrian case as a good possibility to renew personal political goals: the Kurdish independence, the international status and the control over the Middle East. The European Union has been ineffective to successfully find a role in this dispute, abandoning Ankara at the beginning of the struggle and creating an ever growing gap after the June Constitutional Referendum.
The war in Syria will not finish with the dismantlement of the Islamic State, which is unlikely to resist for long. Even in the possibility that the Caliphate will be completely eradicated and all the foreign fighters killed or imprisoned (highly improbable considering the huge number and the important rhetoric behind the terrorist organization), the common enemy, around which all the key actors concentrated their efforts, will fall. The International Community will at that point move its focus to the post-ISIS scenario and to the most important question: who will now rule Syria?
A continuation of the current status quo, with Assad in power, would be a geopolitical catastrophe for Turkey. They will be caught in the middle of a crossfire: on the one hand the fostered axis of Damascus and Iran, which will hardly forget the Turkish attitude during the Civil hostilities, on the other the Kurds. The latter will likely seek the final independence of their State, also considering the role they played in the fight against Islamic terrorism. I do doubt, they would also forget the military immobility of Ankara, when the advance of the Islamic State threatened the Kurdish cities in Iraq and Syria. Erdogan, defeated in this battle, would find itself even more internationally isolated from the European Union and NATO allies, especially after the political events of the last few months, and from the neighbouring Arab countries, which hardly will rely on Turkey as a trusted ally after the hostilities. The Erdogan’s dream of a neo-Ottomanism would eventually crumble. A political victory in the Syrian conflict is the only option available to the Turkish establishment.
Dott. Francesco Pisanò