While trying to accept the American gradual disengagement from Middle East and facing the usual threats on its borders, a period of uncertainty and instability seems to be open for Israel. In this unpredictable scenario, the certainty is that it’s quite unbearable to be focused only on one turning point, excluding the evidence that a multitude of variables and international events are changing the balance of power between the leading countries of Middle East. Traditional alliances, as well as enmities, are going to fall apart or to become more compact. Even if the endless Palestinian issue has reborn, the Shia crescent under Iran’s umbrella is now considered the major problem both by Israel and some Arab countries. Will this common threat be enough to make such different actors to adopt a similar agenda? Will be there a new historical cooperation?
The origins of the relations between these two different worlds date back to 1948, when none of the Arab states recognized any right of existence to Israel after being created through a United Nations Resolution. After that significant historical moment, a breaking point among the Arabs had been constituted by the peace treaty (based on Camp David Accords) signed by Egypt in 1979 and by Jordan in 1994, but always rejected by all other states. While most countries, especially Iran, remained firmly on their initial hostile positions, Saudi Arabia began itself a step by step process to preserve the regional order and to achieve a leading role in Muslim environment. Indeed, the Arab League’s peace process meeting in Lebanon in 2002 was a Saudi proposal aimed at creating normal bilateral diplomatic relations and resolving the Palestinian question just through some minor concessions. At that time, though showing its appreciation, Israel didn’t accept unconditionally those requests that could have led towards a dangerous ethnical clash between Jews and Arabs and, also, towards a loss of military supremacy in the region.
The unifying point is obviously their strong dependence on USA in political and military support, proven by the fact that Israel and Saudi Arabia are the best recipient of American foreign aids and that Washington always supports its allies in front of the international community. On the one hand Riyadh and Jerusalem are so much powerful because they can count on bigger and more modern military capabilities than its counterparts, on the other hand this is exactly the reason why other actors in the arena still see them not as reliable players, but just as servants of western powers. Moreover, this peculiarity is useful for Iran (and its proxies as Hezbollah) in order to call up the entire Arab world and other ethno-religious minorities against the “American invader”, the “Satan Israel” and the “betrayer Saudi Arabia”.
Trump’s disengagement strategy is probably what worries Israel and Saudi Arabia the most since a gradual withdrawal of their precious ally from Middle East may create new strategic necessities and an entire revision of their political agenda. If Muhammad bin Salman can rely on its friendship with all the Gulf monarchies (apart from the ambiguities with Qatar) and on a relative ability in containing internal problems, the Israeli government is feeling itself under the microscope for its rigid actions against Palestinians and sometimes alone in the chaos generated by Arab or Muslim disputes. Although the recent American recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel has proved their mutual loyalty again, it has also added fuel to the fire of the turmoil perpetrated by Hamas in all the sensitive border areas. Despite the decision to disregard the JCPOA, Washington is probably more interested in leaving the area and saving precious military resources than fixing the missing point and solving the situation. Furthermore, while United States unconditioned support seems to be eternal, European countries are appearing more on the fence about being on the same side as always to the disadvantage of their self-image.
Not wanting to stand and watch, Israeli leadership has been readjusting their strategies for some time now, not only in the region but also internationally speaking. Netanyahu is the leader who visited Kremlin the most in search of a new prosperous dialogue with Russia after its clear triumph in Syria. It’s fundamental for Israel to understand if Putin will be able to control Iran’s (and its proxies) expansion and to prevent a new escalation that would jeopardize several fragile boundaries. Thanks to its leading role in the field of innovations, Israel is expanding its global outreach and exploring other new routes of cooperation. From India to China from Africa to Central Asia, Netanyahu and its Ministers are currently signing contracts for energy export with Cyprus, Greece and with “old enemies” like Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority. These changes highlight that Israel no longer wants to be isolated like a Zionist enclave amid Arab counties. On the contrary, its new strategy aims to improve bilateral relations with American common allies and to normalize diplomatic relations with its new precious economical partners. Additionally, Jerusalem is obviously concerned about the upcoming alteration of Middle East balance of power.
Iran’s Shia crescent, in fact, is the biggest and most concrete threat both for Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Syrian war has evidenced the lack of strategy inside the “coalition” guided by the US that has been living an internal fragmentation among Arab countries and problems of convergence with the unpredictable Turkish foreign policy. Russia has successfully come back to the region and has chosen keenly the best allies to expand its regional interests, so that Iran and Syria has clearly entered in the Russian sphere of influence. This constitutes a direct peril not only for American interests, but especially for Israeli and Saudi establishments because, through the large amount of aids from Moscow, Iran is currently enhancing its military capabilities as well as boosting a new revolutionary tendency based on Islamist rhetoric and fear of the West.
The northern border is a crucial territory for Israel since the spillover of the Syrian fighting has made Hezbollah (the best Iranian proxy) stronger and capable to repeatedly overcome Israeli buffer zones. Lebanon party’s intimidating actions are representing a dilemma: is it enough attacking Hezbollah in Syria to prevent its operations or will it be necessary occupying part of the Lebanese territory to reduce its growing power? Being challenging to follow effectively this path, Israeli leaders are now trying to get closer to Saudi Arabia because the military potential of this possible “coalition” would force Iran to ease its assertive guidelines. Sinai and Golan heights are other trouble spots where Israel is facing jihadist groups close to ISIS and the Palestinian party Hamas. Although its undeniable military dominance, the Jewish state is obsessed by a deep siege mindset.
In this period of fluctuations in Middle Eastern policies, the uncertainty is at high levels as always and each country has a different perception about competitors and allies. Specifically, a calculated cooperation with its Arab neighbors against the Iranian threat may eventually bring Israel to larger negotiations with the Palestinian Authority and induce Arab states to keep it separate from their realistic objectives and needs in the region. Nonetheless, the United States aren’t obviously leaving Israel without assistance but, considering its global retirement, Israel may have to follow a new realpolitik together with Arab countries, particularly the reformed Saudi Arabia of MbS.
Dott. Samuele Carlo Ayrton Abrami